Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-148 (2018)
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Abstract

John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.

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Author's Profile

Justin Mooney
University of Alberta

Citations of this work

Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom.Justin Mooney - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):220-229.

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References found in this work

A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will.Robert Kane - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will.Robert Kane - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (1):185-186.
Our idea of God: an introduction to philosophical theology.Thomas V. Morris - 1991 - Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press.
Molinism: The Contemporary Debate.Ken Perszyk (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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