The quantum world, the mind, and the cookie Cutter paradigm

AntiMatters 1 (1):55-90 (2007)
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Abstract

The problem of making sense of quantum mechanics is as much a psychological problem as it is a physical one. There is a conflict between (i) the spatiotemporal structure of the quantum world and (ii) the manner in which the phenomenal world is constructed by our minds and/or brains. Both are examined in detail. Unlike the quantum world, the phenomenal world conforms to the cookie cutter paradigm, according to which the synchronic multiplicity of the world rests on surfaces that carve up space much as cookie cutters carve up rolled-out pastry. The attempt to model the physical world in conformity with this paradigm gives rise to pseudo-problems that foil our attempts at making sense of the quantum world. The fact that quantum mechanics, the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics, is essentially an algorithm for calculating the probabilities of measurement outcomes does indeed give rise to genuine problems, but their solution requires the rejection of unwarranted assumptions rather than the making of further such assumptions. The place of causal stories in a world governed by quantum laws is examined, and it is argued that presentism is inconsistent not only with the “block universe” of special relativity but also with the other corner stone of contemporary physics, quantum mechanics. Finally, the conclusions of this essay are situated within the context of the Vedantic theory of existence set forth in a companion essay [Particles, Consciousness, Volition: A Vedantic Vision].

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