Abstract

Professor Haslett, who claims that he is developing ideas found in the work of C. I. Lewis, presents a method of moral justification and shows which moral principle this method justifies. Since, according to Haslett, it is rational to maximize what one values for its own sake, a moral principle which maximizes such values should be adopted. The principle that does this is a variant of rule utilitarianism labeled "ideal observer utilitarianism." This position differs from the standard versions of rule utilitarianism by replacing quantitative measurement of intrinsic goodness with the preference rankings that would be made by an ideal observer and by choosing rules on the basis of the effects of their enforcement, rather than on the basis of the effects of their universal adoption. Thus, ideal observer utilitarianism consists of all the rules that an ideal observer would choose to enforce. Such an observer would choose rules that are easy to apply and simple enough to be readily learned; only such rules, which people could follow if they wanted to, could be satisfactorily enforced. Since the rules must be simple, Haslett maintains that his position is not open to the objection, frequently made against other versions of utilitarianism, that it would justify such reprehensible acts as the punishment of an innocent person or the breaking of a promise for some slight resultant good. Rules allowing for the occasional performance of such acts would be unsatisfactory because of their complexity.