Rebutting Philosophical Scepticism: An Exploration of Wittgenstein’s Approach in his on Certainty

Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):35-49 (2015)
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Abstract

The best evidence in favour of a claim to knowledge warranties not the possibility of our not being wrong, so says the sceptic. Whatever grounds a putative knower has for some claim, always there exists a gap between the grounds and the claim. Anti-sceptical stands take the form of attempts either to bridge or close the gap. The Cartesian approach for bridging up the gap consists in specifying a guarantee for the subjective ground of beliefs that would secure them from sceptical attacks and elevate them to the status of knowledge. The guarantee is to be sought in the goodness of a deity, which by virtue of its sheer goodness will ensure our not being led into deception in matters of evidences for knowledge-claims, provided our epistemic endowments are used responsibly. Some not satisfied with the Cartesian tradition sought the guarantee elsewhere—in some basic self-justifying and self-evident beliefs providing foundation to our system of beliefs, which conjoined with the evidences for our claims to knowledge make such claims immune to sceptical attacks.

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