Abstract

This Dissertation expands the work of Michael Dummett to issues in the philosophy of science. ;Chapter One relates the issue of realism to that of truth and meaning. ;Dummett's view is subject to the same attacks that doomed logical positivism. In Chapter Two I defend him against these attacks and articulate his view further. In particular, Dummett's view of sense is articulated, and the attacks of Kripke and Hempel are addressed. ;Chapter Three is devoted to applying Dummett's view to Mach's criticisms of absolute space. I argue that the usual reading of Mach is incorrect, and strains the text. I then argue that Mach is best read as arguing that absolute space is a senseless concept. ;Chapter Four argues that van Fraassen's view that we may be agnostic about what a theory says about unobservable objects while believing its edicts about observable ones erases the distinction between belief and agnosticism. I also argue that empirically equivalent theories must have the same truth value. ;The fifth chapter replies to the objection that my position must collapse into something more radical, strict finitism in the case of mathematics. I reply that the objection depends on a view of counterfactuals I am not bound to adopt. ;Finally I apply the apparatus developed to the articulation of an anti-realist theme in the work of Thomas Kuhn