Abstract

True philosophy of management concepts in the discussion is a very ambiguous in nature. Since Tarski in his real management theory in the attempt to define the truth of this predicate, the real management concepts often are two different way of coming to understand reading: one is the truth as opposed to an individual language of the predicate, and the other is the truth as a universal concept, and can be applied to different languages. In order to Quine's use of Tarski's truth management theory, and developed his own concept for a really reasonable "to bracket theories." But, surprisingly, Quine not only that the real management concept must have a inherent language features, that is, when we say a word sentence is true, we just put it belong to a language among; Quine also that really have a concept beyond management features, this concept is really reasonable goal for all scientists, it is not confined within a language. The internal management of real Quine speaking of is a concept very transparent, but the truth is the transcendence of management is particularly nervous secretary. We do not ban asking, for the same What a concept completely different so there will be two kinds of features? This paper attempts to propose a linguistic solution, used to also really reasonable description of the intrinsic nature and concept of transcendence, rather than as any metaphysical concept in neural secret there. The concept of truth is ambiguous in the philosophical jargon. Since Tarski showed how we can avail ourselves of the truth predicate by his theory of truth, the concept of truth has been understood in two different ways. On the one hand, the truth predicate involved in the T-sentences can be interpreted as truth for a particular language. On the other hand, the truth predicate can also be interpreted as truth for all languages. Quine has made use of Tarski's theory of truth and developed his own disquotational view regarding the concept of truth. However, Quine recognizes that the disquotational feature of truth has to be immanent: to call a sentence true is just to include it in our language, in our own theory of world, or in our science. But neither our language nor our science can fix truth. Quine knows very well that truth should hinge on reality but not language, and that our theory of world can be proved wrong. It seems to be this concern that leads Quine to puzzle over a transcendent sense of truth, and allows the kind of truth to be something that scientists are always in quest of, or something that "looms as a heaven that we keep steering for and correcting to". It will be shown that Quine's immanent concept of truth should be understood as "truth-in-L1" in Tarski's theory, and that the transcendent concept of truth can be identified as the general concept of truth which is supposed to be applied to all languages. I will argue that both of Quine's immanent and transcendent concepts should be accommodated at the linguistic level or in the semantic project, rather than being defined and explained from a metaphysical point of view