Abstract

This study is an examination of gardens from the perspective of philosophy of art. Since gardens combine natural and constructed elements, utilize both existing and newly created environments, and engage visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and kinesthetic senses, they provide an opportunity to explore the concept of art and to test the boundaries, usefulness, and general validity of the concept of art. ;In many cultures, gardens are works of art on a par with painting, architecture, and poetry. Twentieth-century Western philosophies of art, however, ignore gardens completely. This study locates the reasons for this dismissal in theoretically generated preferences for arts which are unique and permanent, with a single final form, and under the control of one artist. Since gardens change constantly and involve interaction with nature rather than the simple assertion of the artist's control, they prove awkward for such theories. Moreover, since they are environments, gardens do not function as aesthetic objects, and violate the Kantian principle of aesthetic disinterest. This work considers several versions of disinterest with reference to gardens and other arts, and concludes that disinterest is neither specific to art nor adequate to its power to affect thought, feeling and action. In this light it is the theory which is inadequate to the full range of arts, including gardens. ;Relying on Cassirer's theory of symbolic forms and Langer's notions of significant form and semblance, the study turns to the question of the garden as "great art," that is, art with "significant human content." As vehicles for structuring thought, art in general and gardens in particular differ from language in important ways, and thus bear unique capacities for signification. In one case study, Renaissance knot gardens are shown to have had an important role in the clarification and dissemination of the newly-emerging scientific conception of space