Abstract

I agree with Rey that concepts can yield analytic falsities. Both Rey and I have been discussing empirical concepts, mostly kind concepts that are to some extent adequate, but contain some inadequate elements in their accepted definitions.The second kind are superstitious terms and empirical kind concepts, like the full- blown astrological ones, or concepts characterizing professions ascribing to them magic powers. They usually concern human-social kinds, ascribing to them characteristics or powers in a problematic manner. Propositions analytic in such concepts are both false and a priori. The third kind encompasses positive and negative descriptive-evaluative terms and corresponding thick concepts, that are not empty, but that ascribe positive or negative features to members of a presumed social kind just in virtue of their belonging to the kind. The most common example in nowadays languages are on the negative side, namely slurs ; nowadays rather rare positive counterparts are misplaced laudatives. Again, typical propositions analytic in such concepts are false, and knowable in virtue of being competent in the respective language.