Frege, Objectivity, and the Three Realms
Dissertation, University of Minnesota (
1988)
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Abstract
For Frege the objective is independent of our inner world and the same for everyone. I argue that Frege's demand for objectivity is the result of his concern to make sense out of the practices of science. I point out that science, for Frege, requires agreement and purposeful disagreement among its participants. Without such interaction science reduces to useless, self-indulgent babble. It is the social nature of science that ushers in objectivity. I compare Frege's demand for objectivity with Locke's views on language. ;Frege divides what there is into three realms according to a thing's nature and our access to or knowledge of it. The first realm contains the subjective, the second realm the objective and sensible, and the third realm the objective and non-sensible. It is the third realm to which the objects of mathematics and thoughts, i.e. bearers of truth, belong. We have access to the members of the third realm by reason. I point out that there is a tension in Frege's work. For we would expect Frege to appeal to contemplation of the third realm to justify his foundations of arithmetic and the nature of thoughts. I show, however, that it is the discipline of science, especially mathematics, and our deep rooted practices that influence Frege's conclusions