Abstract

In recent years various metaphysical analyses of events have been advanced, each with somewhat different ontological commitments. In this dissertation I examine the theory of events proposed by Donald Davidson. In the first chapter I discuss the basic features of that theory: that events are concrete particulars which can be described in many different ways. In the second chapter I consider some principles of individuation that might be appropriate for such a theory of events, and I examine one of the major criticisms of the way Davidson individuates events. The criticism is based on what is called the "by" relation, and was suggested by Alvin Goldman, who thinks that it shows an alternative theory of events is needed. Thus Goldman's alternative theory is discussed in this chapter as well. The third chapter is devoted to the allied notions of causation and explanation, and the role played by events in such contexts. This theme is continued in the fourth chapter with an examination of some purported counterexamples to Davidson's theory based on the causal relation. Finally in chapter five I indicate why I think Davidson's theory is the most plausible of all competing theories. In the last half of that chapter I show how Davidson's analysis of events can be applied to solve some metaphysical puzzles about event recurrence and negative events