Abstract

A case of moral weakness, as ordinarily understood, amounts to acting against one's beliefs knowingly. Most commentators interpret Aristotle as merely modifying Socrates' position: moral weakness , as conceived by "common opinion", does not exist. The morally weak man according to "Aristotle", is not ignorant of the correct prudential principle when he acts against it , but rather passion robs him of the particular understanding of what he is about to do. ;My primary aim is to show that Aristotle does not hold the "Socratic" position on moral weakness attributed to him, but that instead he agrees with the common opinions. In chapter one I show how one might plausibly arrive at a Socratic interpretation. Among other things, I show how it is largely based on NE VII, 3. In chapter two, I attempt to refute the Socratic interpretation by showing how implausible it is, and how inconsistent it is with other Aristotelian passages and doctrines. In chapters three through five I lay the foundation for interpreting Aristotle in a non-Socratic manner. In chapter three, I show how moral weakness is psychologically and conceptually possible for Aristotle. He clearly recognizes that it is one thing to know or believe what is right--quite another to desire to act accordingly. In chapter four, I examine Aristotle's theory of character, showing the blameworthy nature of akrasia. In chapter five, I show how one can read Aristotle's theories of action and of practical reasoning in a non-Socratic way. For Aristotle, it is not the thoughts independent of desire that move men, but rather it is the desires and perceptions that move them. In chapter six, I describe Aristotle's common sense picture of akrasia . The akrates chooses to satisfy his sweet tooth even though he knows it is harmful in the long run, because his will to resist his passion is weak. Finally, in chapter seven, I show how even those six crucial passages in NE VII, 3 can be brought within the scope of a common opinions interpretation