The Causal Impotency Objection to Vegetarianism

Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):53-60 (2008)
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Abstract

Alastair Norcross has argued that there is no morally relevant difference between a person who eats meat and a person who tortures puppies in order to enjoy a certain gustatory sensation. We offer an objection to his argument.

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Don A. Merrell
Northwest Arkansas Community College
Aaron Champene
Saint Louis Community College, Meramec

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