Papineau on the intuition of distinctness

SWIF Philosophy of Mind 4 (1) (2002)
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Abstract

Critical comments on David Papineau's idea that people find physicalism about phenomenal consciousness unbelievable because they commit what he calls the 'antipathetic fallacy'.

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Author's Profile

Andrew Melnyk
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?David Papineau - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.

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References found in this work

Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.

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