The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

Erkenntnis 61 (2):495-507 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s10670-004-9321-3

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision.Hans Rott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.
Stability, strength and sensitivity: Converting belief into knowledge.Hans Rott - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):469-493.
Belief revision, rational choice and the unity of reason.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):219 - 240.
The AGM Theory for Belief Revision.Li-wen Xiong - 2005 - Modern Philosophy 1 (3):127-131.
A paraconsistent theory of belief revision.Edwin D. Mares - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612.
Infinitary belief revision.Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
The dynamics of relevance: adaptive belief revision.Peter Verdée & Frederik Van De Putte - 2012 - Synthese 187 (S1):1-42.
A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision.Hans Rott - 1991 - In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer. pp. 135–181.
Two dogmas of belief revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503-522.
Yet more modal logics of preference change and belief revision.Jan van Eijck - unknown
Probabilistic dynamic belief revision.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):179 - 202.
Belief revision in a temporal framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
Belief revision.Hans Rott - 2008 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
89 (#193,069)

6 months
21 (#129,957)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Belief revision.Hans Rott - 2008 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.

View all 6 references / Add more references