Abstract
In a recent symposium a hardy, perennial topic has come once again to occupy the centre of the philosophical stage. The contemporary discussions of meaning and reference, of the philosophical relevance of logical categories, of the grounds for induction, all eventually come to focus upon what a mediaeval philosopher, were he to return, would immediately recognize—not without some quiet satisfaction—to be that complex cluster of difficulties he was wont to classify as “the problem of universals”. The participants in the symposium were chosen with the three-way mediaeval division between Platonic realists, nominalists and Aristotelian realists in mind, one outstanding contemporary representative of each view being sought. This was probably a mistake, since the modern debate has really followed along rather different lines. The present situation of the problem within the philosophy of nature is altogether different from that prevailing in logic. However, the tripartite division does have some relevance in grouping writers on semantics, and it was from among these that the speakers were chosen.