Abstract

I think that Mikel Dufrenne should be praised for his Phenomenologie de l'experience esthetique. The reason why I think this is that he attempts to describe aesthetic experience in terms which are wholly amenable to the experience of art itself from a phenomenological point of view. However, I believe that despite his attempts, Dufrenne ventures into an area which is not phenomenologically accessible, namely ontology. In general, it is the purpose of this thesis to show that Dufrenne's venture into the realm of ontology is beyond the phenomenologically given. And more so, that in attempting such a venture, Dufrenne neglects phenomenologically accessible data, namely, the acts which the spectator deploys when he confronts the aesthetic object. Specifically, it is the purpose of this thesis to show this neglect on Dufrenne's behalf by way of identifying the most simple acts contributed by the spectator. ;This thesis has three main divisions. The first two divisions are primarily expository, although not without criticism. The last division concretizes the criticism of the first two parts and shows my specific point of criticism regarding Dufrenne's text. In effect, the third part could be read as a supplement to Dufrenne's work itself. ;The first division consists in two chapters. The first chapter of this division is purely expository. It recounts Dufrenne's account of the a priori or the accord between man and world which grounds straightforward perception. The second chapter shows how the subjective moments of perception deploy themselves such that this accord is pregnant with, and capable of reading, meaning. There is, however, a critical overtone to the second chapter. This consists in noting that Dufrenne does not recognize the full extent in which the subject arrests and constitutes the meaning of straightforward perception. ;The second division consists in three chapters, all of which are expository and firmly delineate the subject matter as properly 'aesthetic'. For Dufrenne, aesthetic perception is demarcated from straightforward perception on the basis of objective as well as subjective content. With this in mind, this second part examines the a priori accord between spectator and aesthetic object, the nature of the aesthetic object itself, the subjective moments which realize its proper meaning, and the ontology by which the aesthetic object has meaning and this object is capable of expressing the reality of Being itself. The critical exposition makes clear that here, as in Dufrenne's notion of straightforward perception, there is a lack of attention paid to the subjective aspects of perception itself, or to say the same thing, the contribution on behalf of the subject by which he recognizes aesthetic meaning proper