Enculturating folk psychologists

Synthese 199 (1-2):1039-1063 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues that our folk-psychological expertise is a special case of extended and enculturated cognition where we learn to regulate both our own and others’ thought and action in accord with a wide array of culturally shaped folk-psychological norms. The view has three noteworthy features: it challenges a common assumption that the foundational capacity at work in folk-psychological expertise is one of interpreting behaviour in mentalistic terms, arguing instead that successful mindreading is largely a consequence of successful mindshaping; it argues that our folk-psychological expertise is not only socially scaffolded in development, it continues to be socially supported and maintained in maturity, thereby presenting a radically different picture of what mature folk-psychological competency amounts to; it provides grounds for resisting a recent trend in theoretical explanations of quotidian social interaction that downplays the deployment of sophisticated mentalizing resources in understanding what others are doing.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,897

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Critter psychology: On the possibility of nonhuman animal folk psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. pp. 191--209.
First-person Folk Psychology: Mindreading or Mindshaping?Leon De Bruin - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):170-183.
The idea of different folk psychologies.Stephen Mills - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):501 – 519.
The mindreader and the scientist.Heidi Maibom - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
Is folk psychology different?Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.
The Mindreader and the Scientist.Heidi Maibom - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
Folk Psychology without Theory or Simulation.Daniel D. Hutto - 2007 - In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer. pp. 115--135.
From punishment to universalism.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (1):59-72.
Sellars on thoughts and beliefs.Mitch Parsell - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):261-275.
Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-07-02

Downloads
89 (#191,344)

6 months
33 (#102,966)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Victoria McGeer
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Symbolic belief in social cognition.Evan Westra - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):388-408.
Belief in character studies.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):27-42.
Morgan’s Quaker gun and the species of belief.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):119-144.
Folk psychology as a theory.Ian Martin Ravenscroft - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.

View all 92 references / Add more references