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What is the Content of an Intention in Action?
In Maximilian de Gaynesford (ed.), Agents and their Actions. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 61–78 (2011)
Abstract
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content of an intention in action Brandom, that intentions in action as volitions practical knowledge Davidson's outright verdict in favour of acting defect in rationality Davidson, intentions as all‐out judgments of desirability Aristotle's ‘Practical reasoning’ or ‘practical syllogism’ Anscombe's practical syllogism alternative, being disjunctive conception Anscombe's conception of practical knowledge
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Citations of this work
Knowing what you Want.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - In Lucy Campbell (ed.), Forms of Knowledge. Oxford.
The Guise of the Guise of the Bad.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):5-20.
From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.
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