A vehicle with no wheels

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):161-161 (1999)
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Abstract

O'Brien & Opie's theory fails to address the issue of consciousness and introspection. They take for granted that once something is experienced, it can be commented on. But introspection requires neural structures that, according to their theory, have nothing to do with experience as such. That makes the tight coupling between the two in humans a mystery.

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Drew McDermott
Yale University

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