Engaging with “Fringe” Beliefs: Why, When, and How

Episteme:1-16 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that in many cases, there are good reasons to engage with people who hold fringe beliefs such as debunked conspiracy theories. I (1) discuss reasons for engaging with fringe beliefs; (2) discuss the conditions that need to be met for engagement to be worthwhile; (3) consider the question of how to engage with such beliefs, and defend what Jeremy Fantl has called “closed-minded engagement” and (4) address worries that such closed-minded engagement involves problematic deception or manipulation. Thinking about how we engage with irrational emotions offers a way of responding to these concerns. Reflection on engagement with fringe beliefs has wider implications for two distinct philosophical discussions. First, it can help illuminate the nature of beliefs, lending support to the view that not all states which are deeply resistant to evidence thereby fail to be beliefs. Second, an implication of the view I put forth is that it need not constitute a lack of respect to adopt what Peter Strawson called “the objective stance” in relationships.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):743-756.
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
Scepticism and Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2016 - In Diego Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 581-591.
Possible disagreements and defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.
Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Trustworthiness.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-12-16

Downloads
38 (#422,246)

6 months
38 (#99,184)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.

View all 27 references / Add more references