A Response to John Taurek's Should the Numbers Count

Abstract

This short essay outlines the problem Taurek responds to and the argument he uses in Should the Numbers Count. His argument posits that in a situation where you can either prevent harm to one stranger or five strangers but you cannot prevent harm to all six, the best thing to do is is give each person an equal chance of survival by flipping a coin. Although this paper is largely an explication, I do provide a short critique of Taurek's argument. I claim flipping a coin overlooks the worth of the individual people at risk, and other solutions may be better suited to solve this ethical dilemma.

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Should the numbers count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.

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