Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get beyond the Statistics

Philosophical Review 130 (1):185-189 (2021)
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10.1215/00318108-8699656

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Conor Mayo-Wilson
University of Washington

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References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
Likelihood.Anthony William Fairbank Edwards - 1972 - Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press.

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