Abstract

Since compromise is the paradigmatic feature of negotiation, we should expect contemporary negotiation theory to be able to explain its place in dispute resolution. In her contribution to this volume, Amy Cohen argues that orthodox accounts of negotiation—in particular, the model of "principled negotiation" developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury—fail in this task. I argue that the principled negotiation model can accommodate the forms of compromise Cohen identifies. However, two types of error must be avoided. The first type of error is to combine the model with an impoverished account of practical rationality. The second type of error is to extend the model from its original role as a set of practical maxims for negotiators and advance it as a generic conception of the ethics of negotiation as a cooperative activity. Errata: p. 153. should read “(1*) … (b) B prefers W ≥ Z > Y > X”; p. 154. should read “(1**) … (b) B prefers Z > V > Y > X”