Autism, Modularity and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science

Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152 (1998)
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Abstract

Over the past century or more, cognitive neuropsychologists have discussed many of the issues raised in this volume. On the basis of this literature, we argue that autism is not a single homogeneous condition, and so can have no single cause. Instead, each of its symptoms has a cause, and the proper study of autism is the separate study of each of these symptoms and its cause. We also offer evidence to support the radical view advanced by Stoljar and Gold in this volume, namely, that in explaining such syndromes the cognitive level of explanation has priority over the neuroscientific.

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10.1111/1468-0017.00070

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Citations of this work

Philosophie psychopathologique : un survol.Luc Faucher - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):3-17.
Philosophie et psychopathologie.Luc Faucher - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):3.

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