Abstract

Statements to the effect that a certain law exists are generally considered to be statements of certain contingent, empirical facts. We will discuss a particular view of this kind-namely, legal positivism'-as presented by G.H. von Wright in Norm and Action.2 Statements to the effect that a certain law exists are also generally considered to obey the laws of deontic logic. This is also von Wright's view. The combination of these two views creates problems. These become particularly conspicuous with regard to a possible defect in laws-namely, inconsistency.3 They will be discussed in Sections 2-2i of this essay. With regard to certain logical or moral defects in laws, philosophers tend to claim, as truths a priori, that laws cannot have them. With regard to some other defects (for example, excessive complexity) no similar tendency is evident. A discussion of this difference is contained in Sections 22-25 of this essay.