On visual experience of objects: Comments on John Campbell's reference and consciousness

Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220 (2006)
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Abstract

John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience.

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Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

Transparency and the Phenomenology of Extended Cognition.Gloria Andrada - forthcoming - Límite: Revista de Filosofía y Psicología.
Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Simon Prosser - 2012 - In Simon Prosser Francois Recanati (ed.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158-179.
Reference, perception, and attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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