Moral willing as narrative re-envisioning

In Keith M. Murphy & C. Jason Throop (eds.), Toward an Anthropology of the Will. Stanford University Press (2010)
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Abstract

This chapter takes a look at the argument that is directly against a characterization of will as a “moment of choice”. This argument treats willing as a processual development. The chapter shows that willing can be viewed as a gradual change of orientation from one attentional target to another. In this chapter, thinking of will is a morally loaded process that is achieved through emotion work, thought, conversation, and a variety of other experiences. The chapter also briefly refers to recent anthropological considerations of emotion, agency, and intention.

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