“Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: In Defense of a Kantian Account.”

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 116 (2013)
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Abstract

Perceptual experience has the phenomenal character of encountering a mind-independent objective world. What we encounter in perceptual experience is not presented to us as a state of our own mind. Rather, we seem to encounter facts, objects, and properties that are independent from our mind. In short, perceptual experience has phenomenal objectivity. This paper proposes and defends a Kantian account of phenomenal objectivity that grounds it in experiences of lawlike regularities. The paper offers a novel account of the connection between phenomenology and intentionality. It also sheds some light on one of the central themes in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

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Author's Profile

Farid Masrour
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Attention and mental paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Objective Phenomenology.Andrew Y. Lee - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1197–1216.
Against representationalism.David Papineau - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347.

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References found in this work

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The bounds of sense: an essay on Kant's Critique of pure reason.P. F. Strawson - 1966 - [New York]: Harper & Row, Barnes & Noble Import Division. Edited by Lucy Allais.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):640-642.

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