Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift

Philosophical Studies 115 (1):81-97 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the ψ that p’ strongly suggests that `that’-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositionaldenotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that’-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation of descriptive predication can be introduced in a way that resolves the dilemma withoutsacrificing the singular term analysis of `that’-clauses.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Direct Realism, Skepticism and Truth.John Peterson - 1988 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1):147-150.
Reliabilist responses to the value of knowledge problem.Christian Piller - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):121-135.
Something like ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
Propositions, Structure and Representation.Thomas Hodgson - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):339-349.
Wittgenstein and the naming relation.Paul D. Wienpahl - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):329 – 347.
Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
Russell's way out of the paradox of propositions.André Fuhrmann - 2002 - History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (3):197-213.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
105 (#166,212)

6 months
12 (#208,861)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Marc Moffett
University of Texas at El Paso

Citations of this work

Hopes, Fears, and Other Grammatical Scarecrows.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):63-105.
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Prior's puzzle generalized.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):196-220.
Recent work on propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations