Abstract

THE problem of universals has been with us at least since the time of Plato and it is no surprise that the first solution was what can be termed a realist one. Not a few have argued that there is something commonsensical about the claim that we call some things by a common term because it seems quite plausible that there are kinds of things and that they are not entirely the creations of our minds. The path of realism has been trodden by many notables, and current literature calls attention to the fact that, in spite of all its problems, the realist view still has its own appeal. This is true now and is even more easily documented for the thirteenth century when the question of the ontological status of universals was fiercely debated in the young universities of Europe. Roger Bacon was beginning his teaching career at the University of Paris in the early 1240s and an inspection of his works reveals that on three occasions he entered the debate ex professo, namely, in his Questiones supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis, in his Questiones altere supra libros prime philosophie Aristotelis, and in the Liber primus communium naturalium Fratris Rogeri. Hence it is in these that we should look to discover whether he was a nominalist, a moderate realist, or an extreme realist, or indeed whether he developed a position uniquely his own.