The Patient preference predictor and the objection from higher-order preferences

Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (3):221-222 (2023)
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Abstract

Recently, Jardas _et al_ have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas _et al_. I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as powerful as the ones discussed by Jardas _et al._.

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Jakob Mainz
Aalborg University (PhD)