Abstract

In this paper we propose to characterize Chauncey Wright's empirical psychology, or “psychozoology” as he called it, from a methodological standpoint. By a methodological characterization of any science we mean an analysis of its structure as distinguished from its actual findings. We mean, for example, a description of the kind or type of variable and law in any science as distinguished from the actual particular content of any defined variable or discovered law. This distinction between variables and the laws which obtain between them is, as a matter of fact, itself a methodological description of the findings of science. Wright, it is true, did not discuss the subject matter of psychology from a methodological point of view, perhaps because he was involved in developing the body of knowledge itself. On the other hand, his discussions of physics and chemistry, areas in which the subject matter was well developed, took a methodological turn. Regardless of Wright's own practice, however, the methodological implications of his contribution in actual theory to “empirical” psychology remain, and drawing these implications is one means by which we will show the significance of his work relative to the development of psychological concepts and laws. We will consider what specific ways his position is similar to, and different from, the later American functionalists' views on these matters and on the problem of causal interaction between physical and phenomenal events. Any similarity will perhaps gain in significance if, as it is further claimed, there is an actual historical influence of Wright on Dewey, the most noted functionalist.