Abstract

Over the past half-century, formal, machine-executable proofs have been developed for an impressive range of mathematical theorems. Formalists argue that such proofs should be seen as providing the fully worked out proofs of which mathematicians’ proofs are sketches. Nonformalists argue that this conception of the relationship of formal to informal proofs cannot explain the fact that formal proofs lack essential virtues enjoyed by mathematicians’ proofs, the fact, for example, that formal proofs are not convincing and lack the explanatory power of their informal counterparts. Formal proofs do not yield mathematical insight or understanding, and they are not fruitful in the way that informal proofs can be, for instance, in suggesting novel approaches to old problems. And yet, there is a clear sense in which the formalist is right: Formal proofs do seem to make explicit what is otherwise taken for granted in the mathematician’s reasoning. Very recent work uncovers the source of the dilemma by showing that rigor does not entail formalism insofar as rigor, unlike formalism, is compatible with contentfulness. Mathematical proofs, were they to be recast in a Leibnizian language, at once a characteristica and a calculus, would be, or could be made to be, completely gap-free and hence machine checkable. Because as so recast they would be grounded in mathematical ideas, they would not be machine executable. It is on just this basis that a compelling account can be given of the fact that formal proofs are mostly irrelevant to mathematicians in their practice.