The Reliabilist Theory of Rational Belief

The Monist 68 (2):203-225 (1985)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Niceties aside, Reliabilism is the claim that a belief is justified or rational if and only if it has a reliable source. One way to arrive at a belief is by inferring it from others through the application of a rule of inference. Hence Reliabilism has the consequence that a belief arrived at by applying a given rule of inference is rational if and only if arriving at that belief by applying the rule is reliable. This consequence of Reliabilism I will call the Reliabilist’s Thesis.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,611

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rational belief and social interaction.Daniel M. Hausman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):163-164.
Believing conjunctions.Simon J. Evnine - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):201-227.
How to Be a Reliabilist.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
Belief system foundations of backward induction.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403.
The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.
Belief-in Revisited: A Reply to Williams.J. J. Macintosh - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (4):487 - 503.
Scepticism and Reliable Belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Naturalising normativity.Mark Colyvan - 2009 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-21

Downloads
48 (#334,249)

6 months
3 (#984,719)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Luper
Trinity University

Citations of this work

Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
Epistemic relativism.Steven Luper - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):271–295.
The knower, inside and out.Steven Luper-Foy - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):349-67.
Truly Justified Belief.G. Vision - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):405-446.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references