Do We-Experiences Require an Intentional Object? On the Nature of Reflective Communities

In Sebastian Luft & Ruth Hagengruber (eds.), Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology: We-Experiences, Communal Life, and Joint Action. Springer Verlag. pp. 129-143 (2018)
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Abstract

What does it mean to be a community and to be in a community? Can this social phenomenon be analogized to an individual person with her interwoven opinions, wants, and desires? Or is a community a phenomenon sui generis that requires its own methods and tools for research? Concretely: What does it mean that a community may achieve certain acts? And what about the intentional object of such an act, which has also been referred to as “social act”? These questions raise the methodological ones: how is it even possible to characterize a community, such that it can be said to issue social acts? And how can such an inquiry be carried out, does it require an outside perspective or one from within a community, or can it be done by both?

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Sebastian Luft
Paderborn University

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