Abstract

In all societies, past and present, one can find social relationships marked by political domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized so far as possible. This being so, it stands to reason that political and social theorists would have attempted a general analysis of the concept of domination. Surprisingly, however, this is not the case. General accounts of political domination are few and far between; even among those that can be found, most are brief, ad hoc, restricted to one or another aspect or form of domination, hopelessly vague, or some combination of these. None discusses the relative advantages or disadvantages of two or more competing conceptions. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first, that domination should be understood as a condition suffered by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. This is called the arbitrary power conception of domination. It argues second, that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit the unnecessary suffering of domination, and that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions of any society should be organized so as to minimize domination to the extent that this is possible. This is called justice as minimizing domination, a conception of political or social justice. This study employs a variety of methodological techniques---including conceptual analysis, formal modeling and game theory, social theory, and moral philosophy. Existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, political liberty, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. For these reasons, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests