Weighing Reasons

New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA (2016)
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Abstract

Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy

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Author Profiles

Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania
Barry Maguire
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Grounding nonexistence.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):209-229.
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.
Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.

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