The role of 'complex' empiricism in the debates about satellite data and climate models

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (2):390-401 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

climate scientists have been engaged in a decades-long debate over the standing of satellite measurements of the temperature trends of the atmosphere above the surface of the earth. This is especially significant because skeptics of global warming and the greenhouse effect have utilized this debate to spread doubt about global climate models used to predict future states of climate. I use this case from an under-studied science to illustrate two distinct philosophical approaches to the relation among data, scientists, measurement, models, and theory. I argue that distinguishing between 'direct' empiricist and 'complex' empiricist approaches helps us understand and analyze this important scientific episode. I also introduce a complex empiricist account of testing and evaluation, and contrast it with the basic Hypothetico-Deductive approach to the climate models used by the direct empiricists. This more developed complex empiricist apporach will serve philosophy of science well, as computational models become more wide-spread in the sciences.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,532

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Understanding pluralism in climate modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984.
Varieties of support and confirmation of climate models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.
What do numerical (climate) models really represent?Gabriele Gramelsberger - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):296-302.
Data models and the acquisition and manipulation of data.Todd Harris - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1508-1517.
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation.Katie Steele & Charlotte Werndl - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):609-635.
Using models to represent reality.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - In L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer/Plenum. pp. 41--57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-03

Downloads
129 (#140,494)

6 months
13 (#189,886)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elisabeth Lloyd
Indiana University, Bloomington

References found in this work

Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984.
Varieties of support and confirmation of climate models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.
I—Elisabeth A. Lloyd: Varieties of Support and Confirmation of Climate Models.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):213-232.

Add more references