Abstract

Matthew Calarco refers to Derrida's apparently dogmatic “insistence on maintaining the human-animal distinction.” What would it mean to “overcome” this distinction? Can we simply let it go? Derrida's stance is compared with a certain dogma of Heidegger's and the bêtise of frontal endorsement or denial of it. Perhaps the distinction between mention and use makes possible a relocation of Derrida's apparent dogmatism. His reservations over the distinction between mention and use do not prevent his mentioning animals ( animaux ) in the neologism animot . What does it mean to say that the human-animal distinction is abyssal? United by a common concern, the parties to the debate focused on in this essay (Derrida, Calarco, Har-away, Smuts, Llewelyn) follow different procedures that, however, complement one another