Abstract

In “The Genealogy ofive Practices,” Mary Beth Mader addresses a peculiar problem seemingly inherent to Foucauldian genealogy—namely, all genealogies require the use of abstractive practices in order to be conducted; however, abstraction itself, just like the object of genealogy, is historically contingent. How, then, would one conduct a genealogy of abstraction itself? How to conduct, in other words, a genealogy whose object of inquiry is, at the same time, one of its operative tools? This commentary seeks to expand on Mader's analysis by examining its implication for understanding Foucault's methodology in general. That is, if Mader is correct, then it seems that Foucault does not in fact provide a rigid methodology, but rather aims to orient our attention to the contingent and discontinuous nature of history. In doing so, he aims to develop certain sensitivities and attitudes by virtue of which one is able to recognize epistemic ruptures that mark the transition between distinct epistemes.