Dynamic sets of potentially interchangeable connotations: A theory of mental objects

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):389-390 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Analogy-making is an ability with which we can abstract from surface similarities and perceive deep, meaningful similarities between different mental objects and situations. I propose that mental objects are dynamically changing sets of potentially interchangeable connotations. Unfortunately, most models of analogy seem devoid of both semantics and relevance-extraction, postulating analogy as a one-to-one mapping devoid of connotation transfer

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the objects and interpretants of signs: Comments on T. L. short's.Risto Hilpinen - 2007 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4).
Environmental aesthetics and the dynamic object.David E. W. Fenner - 2006 - Ethics and the Environment 11 (1):1-19.
Reference to possible worlds.Matthew Stone - 1999 - Technical Report 49, Rutgers University Center for Cognitive Science.
Sets and Point-Sets: Five Grades of Set-Theoretic Involvement in Geometry.John P. Burgess - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:456 - 463.
On legal order: Some criticism of the received view. [REVIEW]Riccardo Guastini - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (3):263-272.
Metaphorical semeiotic referents: Dyadic objects.Carl R. Hausman - 2007 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (2):276-287.
On the Objects and Interpretants of Signs: Comments on T. L. Short's Peirce's Theory of Signs.Risto Hilpinen - 2007 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4):610 - 618.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
25 (#651,065)

6 months
8 (#411,508)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations