Abstract

Copredication occurs when a sentence receives a true reading despite prima facie ascribing categorically incompatible properties to a single entity. For example, ‘The red book is by Tolstoy’ can have a true reading even though it seems that being red is only a property of physical copies, while being by Tolstoy is only a property of informational texts. A tempting strategy for resolving this tension is to claim that at least one of the predicates has a non-standard interpretation, with the salient proposal involving reinterpretation via meaning transfer. For example, in ‘The red book is by Tolstoy’, one could hold that the predicate ‘by Tolstoy’ is reinterpreted (or on the more specific proposal, transferred) to ascribe a property that physical copies can uncontroversially instantiate, such as expresses an informational text by Tolstoy. On this view, the truth of the copredicational sentence is no longer mysterious. Furthermore, such a reinterpretation view can give a straightforward account of a range of puzzling copredicational sentences involving counting an individuation. Despite these substantial virtues, we will argue that reinterpretation approaches to copredication are untenable. In §1 we introduce reinterpretation views of copredication and contrast them with key alternatives. In §2 we argue against a general reinterpretation theory of copredication on which every copredicational sentence contains at least one reinterpreted predicate. We also raise additional problems for the more specific proposal of implementing reinterpretation via meaning transfer. In §3 we argue against more limited appeals to reinterpretation on which only some copredicational sentences contain reinterpretation. In §4 we criticize a series of arguments in favour of reinterpretation theories. The upshot is that reinterpretation theories of copredication, and in particular, meaning transfer-based accounts, should be rejected.