Variasjoner I funksjonsevne some vilkår: En diskusjon av funksjonshemming og menneskesyn I lys av Martha Nussbaums politiske filosofi

Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 47 (2):130-142 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum criticizes John Rawls theory of justice, Justice as fairness, for not answering well enough to challenges related to disability as human condition. People have various abilities and impairments throughout their lives and some people live with impairments in their entire life. In her theory of justice, The capabilities approach, disability as human condition is integrated and Nussbaum argues that a just society should enable citizens to live lives that are worthy of human dignity. By including disability, and discussing what this entail for her theory, Nussbaum focuses on a topic of ethical importance; the right for all people to live in the world. Her theory is, highly relevant in discussing what people should be entitled to do and be, linked to a conception of disability as a relation between individuals and their social, political, cultural and material environments. The capabilities approach is a valuable contribution to a discussion on citizenship and rights, by seriously integrating a disability perspective. The capabilities approach risks to fall short, however, in terms of inclusion, if interpreted as a normative definition of who should belong to humanity.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,682

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Dignity, Capability, and Profound Disability.John Vorhaus - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):462-478.
Cognitive Disability, Capabilities, and Justice.Serene Khader - 2008 - Essays in Philosophy 9 (1):93-112.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-24

Downloads
13 (#1,056,248)

6 months
3 (#1,026,267)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references