The organism view defended

The Monist 89 (3):334-350 (2006)
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Abstract

What are you and I essentially? When do you and I come into and go out of existence? A common response is that we are essentially organisms, that is, we come into existence as organisms and go out of existence when we cease to be organisms. Jeff McMahan has put forward two arguments against the Organism View: the case of dicephalus and a special case of hemispheric commissurotomy. In this paper, I defend the Organism View against these two cases. Because it is possible to devise more McMahanian-type cases, I also provide a more general solution to these kinds of cases.

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S. Matthew Liao
New York University

Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning.Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
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References found in this work

Human Identity and Bioethics.David DeGrazia - 2005 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Do zygotes become people?W. R. Carter - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):77-95.
Personal identity and survival.Jenefer M. Robinson - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (June):319-28.

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