Abstract

Although violence has always been in governments’ toolkit against civil society organizations (CSOs), there has been a global trend where governments set legal and logistical barriers to non-violently repress CSOs, especially INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) since the mid-2000s. During this period, states present variations in CSO repression, ranging from moderate regulation to violent expulsion. Why do countries vary the repression? I argue that different levels of repression are based on governments’ perceived repression effectiveness in reducing INGOs’ threats. For better illustration, I propose the effectiveness-perception framework, where repression effectiveness comes from the interaction between regime type and local trust in INGOs, while the perception of effectiveness is rooted in the domestic political structure. To conduct empirical tests, I create a latent variable, local trust, to measure threats of INGOs conditional on local communities. Relying on the sample from 1996 to 2012, I find that consolidated democracies and autocracies, compared to middling countries, are more likely to adjust the repression levels based on local trust in INGOs. I expect the finding to produce some strategy-relevant insights for INGOs’ survival in the current political environment.