Abstract

ABSTRACTMerleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception begins with a critique of the philosophical notion of sensation. Even though it is often generally said to be aimed at traditional psychology or empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s critique is without question also applicable to Husserl’s notion of sensation. The first half of this paper will offer an interpretation of Husserl’s conception of sensation as the stuff of perception and the pregivennesses for all of the Ego’s operations. And then it will attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty’s critique in the Phenomenology of Perception can precisely be viewed as aiming at Husserl. In the end, we should be able to see that Merleau-Ponty’s critique is still relevant today, especially in regard to some recent attempts to put Husserl into the camp of non-representationalism in contemporary philosophy of mind.