Why must Organized Beings be Judged in Teleological Terms?

In Paula Órdenes & Anna Pickhan (eds.), Teleologische Reflexion in Kants Philosophie. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. pp. 215-232 (2019)
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Abstract

In the paper I discuss Kant’s justification for judging organized beings in teleological terms, through the concept of the “end” or “natural end”. Nowadays there are different answers to this question. For instance, from the perspective of what I call the “objective point of view”, organized beings have some objective characteristics that justify us having to comprehend them teleologically, while from that of what I call the “ordinary subjective viewpoint”, we must do so only on account of the discursive character of our understanding. I argue that both positions are, for different reasons that I outline, misleading, and I offer my own answer, a refined subjective position. By means of the distinction between the “essential character” of our understanding, on the one hand, and its “limits”, on the other, I hope to give a consistent answer to the question why organized beings must be judged teleologically and one that is well-supported in the sources.

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