Abstract

In this work, I defend the Theory of Appearing, an explicatory account of the perceptual experience of concrete particulars. On this Direct Realist, act/object theory, the perceptual, experience of concrete particulars essentially consists in one or more physical space occupants appearing as C to a subject S. Perception essentially consists in one or more physical space occupants appearing as it is . Misperception essentially consists in one or more physical space occupants appearing as it is not. ;My defense of the Theory of Appearing comes in four main interrelated parts: noting the Theory of Appearing's close fit with important pretheoretical intuitions about perceptual experience, showing that none of the objections canvassed in this work defeats the Theory of Appearing, eliminating alternatives by undercutting reasons for, and by adducing reasons against, the main rivals to the Theory of Appearing and detailing some of the important epistemological and metaphysical payoff the Theory of Appearing affords, namely, a defensible account of Foundationalism and the Given, and support for an argument in the spirit of Kant's Refutation of Idealism