Moral Psychology with Nietzsche

New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2019)
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Abstract

Brian Leiter draws on empirical psychology to defend a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts play almost no significant role in our actions. Nietzsche emerges as not just a great philosopher but a prescient psychologist.

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Brian Leiter
University of Chicago

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