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Can we know that we have free will by introspection?

Journal of Philosophy 57 (March):145-156 (1960) Copy BIBT_EX

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University of Arizona

Categories

Introspection and Introspectionism in Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Libertarianism about Free Will in Philosophy of Action

Thomas Reid in 17th/18th Century Philosophy

Topics in Free Will, Misc in Philosophy of Action

Keywords

Causation Determinism Epistemology Free Will Introspection Knowledge Possibility Campbell, C Hempel Reid

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0022362X

DOI

10.2307/2022533

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Citations of this work

Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.

The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.

Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 126–50.

The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.

Is agentive experience compatible with determinism?Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.

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